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be considered during the formulation of the
program and not later when the program
structure is in place and the program is in
progress. Change is almost always costly; re-
quirements traceability provides a bulwark
against which the program manager and the
systems engineer can stand and defend.
Baseline Cost, Schedule
and Performance
The three main parameters in the control
process--cost, schedule and performance--
are the program manager's bread and but-
ter. Again, program definition is vital and
necessary from the very beginning. It may
be argued that clear definition is not possi-
ble, particularly early in the program; nev-
ertheless, an approved, traceable baseline,
although it may alter, must be known at any
given time, and must include everything in
the program. The "I forgots" can kill you.
The key to success in handling these three
parameters is to manage the balancing act
between them. Cost, schedule and perfor-
mance are usually dependent variables and
at various times, one or another may assume
greater or lesser importance. A single vari-
able, however, should never be changed
without knowing the impact on the other
two. Within the NASA culture, performance
is generally the predominant factor, and
schedule is a distant second. Cost tends to be
considered mostly in the context of the annu-
al appropriation, but from the point of view
of the program manager, all three param-
eters must be defined and approved continu-
ously, which is a function of the systems en-
gineering process.
Program Risk Analysis
In recent years, especially since the Chal-
lenger accident, program risk analysis has
come tobe used largely in the context of crew
safety, but this is only a part of program
risk.Basically,program risk analysis asses-
ses the probability of meeting requirements
as changes occur. A number of analytical
tools now available can be used to under-
stand the relationships between cost, perfor-
mance and schedule. Again, a small group
within the systems engineering organization
should be dedicated to understanding the
impact of any change on all three param-
eters. Armed with this information, risk can
be reduced in many ways. Adding more mon-
ey, reducing the performance requirements,
or extending the schedule are most often
used. A competent systems engineer will
know the relationships between these three
variables and the impact of any situation on
the total program.
The Role of Cost in Phased Procurement
The most common form of procuring high
technology capability within the Federal
Government is known as phased procure-
ment. The theory behind this procurement
method is that commitment to the program
gradually increases with time and in dis-
crete stages. Within NASA, there are four
standard phases; others are beginning to
creep in as the ability to establish new pro-
grams becomes more difficult and the dura-
tion and cost of operations becomes a more
significant part of total program costs. The
role of cost is different in each of the phases.
The phases are:
Pre-Phase A: This is a very unstructured
period that examines new ideas, usually
without central control and mostly ori-
ented toward small studies. This period
can last for a decade or more and produces
the list of ideas and alternatives from
which new programs are selected.
Phase A: Sometimes called the feasibility
phase, this is a structured version of the
previous phase. Usually a task force or
program office is established, and multi-
ple contracts will be awarded. The goal of
this phase, which may last for several
years but usually is limited to one or two
years, is to decide whether a new pro-
gram will be started and what its purpose
and content should be. This phase repre-
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sents less than one percent of the total
program costs. Nevertheless, it is largely
a systems engineering effort and sets the
stage for everything that follows.
Phase B: Sometimes known as program
definition, this phase is the most impor-
tant in establishing the basic parameters
of the program. By the time this phase is
finished (a period of two or three years),
the program rationale, cost, schedule,
performance, management style and the
most likely technical solution will have
been established. This phase usually in-
volves multiple contracts to establish a
variety of ideas and a competitive envi-
ronment, should the program proceed.
Cost is continuously assessed as a func-
tion of design solutions relative to basic
requirements. Studies indicate that from
five to ten percent of the total program
costs will need to be expended if control is
to be maintained over the program dur-
ing Phases C and D.
Phase C/D: Originally separate phases,
this period covers design, development,
test and evaluation. Contracts may be
open to all qualified bidders or only to
those involved in the previous phase. Al-
though competition is not usually open
between Phases C and D, commitment to
Phase D depends on a successful and ac-
ceptable design. In past programs, two-
thirds of the total program cost was ex-
pended during this period. The systems
engineering role has begun to shift to-
ward systems specification and systems
interfaces. The secret to cost control is a
sound definition of end items and their in-
terfaces with a tight hold on changes.
Phase E: In most past programs, the oper-
ations costs were less than 20 percent of
the totalcost.This was because there was
a definite end to a relatively short-term
program. In recent years, particularly in
the manned programs, the length of the
operational phase has increased signifi-
cantly. In the case of the Shuttle, it could
be conceived as indefinitely long. For this
reason, life cycle costs should be a major
consideration from the beginning.
Selling the Program
The definition of a new start within NASA
varies by program and organization but can
generally be said to occur at the beginning of
Phase B. Prior to that time, the program
manager is selling the program. The total
expenditure of funds during the selling peri-
od is usually far less than one percent of the
final program costs; this is, however, when
the basic parameters of the program are es-
tablished. It is a time of building constitu-
ents both inside and outside the Agency. As-
suming that a feasible technical solution is
available and an acceptable management
scheme can be provided, much of the debate
about whether a program should be ap-
proved centers largely around the question
of cost. Of course, with only preliminary de-
signs available, only cost estimates can be
made and these are obtained from standard
cost models.
Cost Estimating
During Phase A of the program, when the
most rudimentary designs are available, it is
essential that program cost estimates are
made before the program start can be autho-
rized. Estimates are made using cost models
that have been developed on the basis of past
experience on similar programs. These
models are among the most arcane devices
invented by engineers, so a few words on
how they work are appropriate.
Past experience is captured by documenting
the cost of each system on the basis of
weight. Regression analysis is performed to
determine a straight line log relationship.
Once the weight of the system has been esti-
mated, the cost can be determined. This esti-
mate is multiplied by a complexity factor to
allow for the risk associated with the select-
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ed technology and may vary from as little as
0.50 to 2 or more. This is repeated for each
system, and the total becomes the baseline
cost. This total is multiplied by a factor to al-
low for systems engineering and testing by
the prime contractor. This is known as the
"prime wrap" factor and is again determined
based on all relevant past experience.
All prime contractor estimates are added
and then multiplied by a second factor
known as the "nonprime wrap." This is the
cost of government work. Finally, a reserve
factor is used to allow for problems during
the program. There are separate cost models
for manned and unmanned programs, which
are significantly different. In general, for the
unmanned programs, about 40 cents of every
dollar goes to hardware, and in the manned
programs, about 20 cents.
These cost models pose a great many prob-
lems. First, they are normalized on the basis
of weight. Clearly this is not valid in all
cases, particularly structure. Second, they do
not explain why the costs are what they are.
Factors such as management style, procure-
ment strategy and test philosophy are not
differentiated. Third, they include all past
experience, including errors and overruns.
In this respect, these cost models assume no
learning curve. As it was in the beginning, is
now, and forever shall be! They must there-
fore be used with great caution. From the
systems engineer's point of view, these cost
models can be used to assess the relative
costs of various design solutions; on an abso-
lute basis, however, they are of little use.
So far we have been able to make a tentative
estimate of the cost of the flight system. To
this must be added the cost of new facilities,
including launch, test beds, flight oper-
ations, networks and data reduction, among
others, and finally the cost of operations. It is
at this point that the program manager faces
the first dilemma: What should be included
in the program cost? That sounds like a sim-
ple question, but it is complicated by the fact
that not all costs are under the control of the
program manager, nor is he or she responsi-
ble for justifying all of the associated appro-
priations.
For example, launch costs are provided by
the Office of Space Flight, network costs are
provided by the Office of Operations, and civ-
il service costs are provided by the research
and program management fund managed by
the Office of the Comptroller. New buildings
are provided under the construction of facili-
ties budget. In addition, most new program
managers are surprised to find that a tax
based on the number of civil servants work-
ing on the program varies from Center to
Center, and neither the number of people
nor the level of tax is under the control of the
program manager. Taxation without repre-
sentation! Despite this dilemma, the systems
engineer should include all of these factors
in the cost estimate because the chosen de-
sign will affect all of them; overall program
costs are as important to the Agency as di-
rect program costs.
Program costs tend to be presented as only
those costs that are under the control of the
program manager. No matter how much this
limitation is stated in presentations, it is as-
sumed that it is the total program cost (espe-
cially when it is a popular program) that has
the support of the Executive branch, the
Congress and other constituencies. It is no
wonder that the average program increases
in cost by a factor of about three from the
time of approval to completion and that most
program managers during this period are ac-
cused of everything from naivet6 to self-
deception to outright lies. There is the added
ethical question that if all costs were actual-
ly presented, the program would not be ap-
proved!
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Defining the Program
This phase of the program, usually known as
Phase B, will take from one to two years. The
purpose is to take the various concepts con-
sidered in Phase A and select a single valid
solution. By the time Phase B is over, a clear
set of requirements should be available with
a complete set of functional specifications
and a cost estimate based on preliminary de-
sign concepts rather than on cost models.
These are primarily produced by the systems
engineering organization and include at
least one preliminary design and selected
technologies with well-understood risks as-
sociated with those technologies.
Don Hearth, former director of the NASA
Langley Research Center, performed a study
on how much this phase has cost for various
past programs as compared to the success of
the program in later phases. Success was
measured as the ability to maintain perfor-
mance, schedule and cost as determined at
the end of Phase B. He concluded that the
most successful programs spent between five
and ten percent of the total program cost in
Phase B. The scope was limited to unmanned
programs, but the rationale can reasonably
be extended to manned programs.
Apart from establishing a credible function-
al system specification, it is essential to de-
termine the management structure, the pro-
curement strategy and a baseline cost for the
life of the program, including the cost of op-
erations. Once again, the primary method
for cost estimating is the cost model, but
there should be sufficient detail available to
check the model with bottom-up costs based
on feasible design solutions. The systems en-
gineer is responsible for comparing these
two cost estimating techniques. It is unwise
to proceed to the next phases unless some
bottom-up cost estimating has been per-
formed.
Perhaps the most important product of this
phase is a complete work breakdown struc-
ture.Again, thisislargely the responsibility
of the systems engineering organization.
The axiom to be followed is, "You cannot
control what you have not defined."
Work Breakdown Structure
Too often a program will be approved with-
out a well-established work breakdown
structure (WBS) describing the whole pro-
gram, which inevitably results in large cost
overruns. The WBS is the basis for the pro-
curement strategy and often for the manage-
ment structure. Without it, program
changes will take place after the contractors
are in place and have to be paid. Overlaps
between contracts, as well as missing ele-
ments and contract changes, are always ex-
pensive. The following simple rules have to
be followed:
1. Each element of the WBS should contain
a deliverable that can be defined.
. The sum of the WBS elements must be
the total program. (Note that a given pro-
gram manager may not have the respon-
sibility for all elements, but they should
each be defined and allocated.)
. Each deliverable should be accompanied
by a cost and a schedule. The cost should
include a reserve based on the estimated
risk associated with that element, and
the cost should be allocated to that ele-
ment.
As simple as these rules sound and as much
as NASA requires contractors to adhere to
them, the internal track record isdismal. We
can go a long way toward containing costs if
discipline is established early and main-
tained.
One last word of caution. A WBS element
should never be established on the basis of
function or organization. These elements are
not end items. Other mechanisms exist for
identifying these elements, which in general
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could be defined as program overhead and
not entirely the responsibility of the pro-
gram manager. They should be recognized
for what they are and identified, but they
should not be included in the WBS.
Managing the Program
We have now reached the time in the pro-
gram when promises have been made, deals
have been struck, and the program has been
approved. All that remains is to deliver. A
custom within NASA stipulates that new
managers are instilled with the belief that
the skills required to sell a program and to
define it are different than those required to
run it. Certainly some changes can be ex-
pected, but I believe that such changes are
better if they occur sometime after a phase
has been entered and the basic management
structures have been established. What the
program needs at this time is ownership of
the concept, and changes in management
will usually result in program changes that
inevitably will lead to increased costs. This
is particularly true of the systems engineer-
ing group that has carefully balanced the re-
quirements against the design and is famil-
iar with the "why" of a decision as well as
the "what." So far the total expenditure has
been relatively low, but once the contractors
are onboard and the manpower begins to
build up, costs can escalate at an alarming
rate. In a very short time, increases or de-
creases in performance, extensions or reduc-
tions in schedule, and decreases in annual
funding will all increase cost.
Design to Cost. There is much talk about
design to cost but very little action, and for
this there are a number of reasons. Earlier, I
mentioned that within NASA there is a ten-
dency to order the three variables by perfor-
mance first, schedule second, and only then
worry about cost. So by tradition, cost tends
to be put on the back burner. One of the rea-
sons for this is that during the Apollo pro-
gram, the cost function was transferred to
the budget and program control groups. In a
program where the technical problems were
so difficult and the budgets were ample, this
was understandable, but this is no longer the
case. This situation resulted in a shift away
from making the design engineer account-
able for cost as well as performance and
schedule.
The second problem occurs when the cost is
not allocated at the WBS element level,
where it can readily be traded against per-
formance and schedule and easily traced. I
believe that cost must be allocated to the
lowest possible level (a little scary for the
program manager), but unless this is done, it
will be impossible to hold the designer ac-
countable and unlikely that overall costs
will be held in check.
The third problem is that in an organization
that prides itself on technical excellence, it is
very difficult not to make things a little bet-
ter; consequently, there are always plenty of
ideas around. The credo of the systems engi-
neer should therefore be: "The better is the
enemy of the good."
Design to Life Cycle Cost. Over the past
decade, the operational costs of NASA pro-
grams have steadily risen as a percentage of
total program costs, largely due to the fact
that programs have a longer life in the oper-
ational phase. Whereas 20 years ago oper-
ational costs amounted to no more than 20
percent of costs, they are now approaching
half of the NASA budget. It is time to place
design to life cycle cost on an equal footing
with design to cost. The dilemma is that a
design that allows low-cost operations will
usually demand higher development costs
and in turn, this means larger front-end pro-
gram costs. It is essential that the systems
engineer make these assessments. The sim-
plest thing for a program manager to do is
walk away from this dilemma and let the op-
erations people worry about it later. As this
is becoming an overall problem for the Agen-
cy, the ability to make new starts will de-
43
READINGS IN PROGRAM CONTROL
pend on the ability to ensure that a sufficient
percentage of the budget is available for op-
erations.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to get enough
operations people to participate early in the
program, but I believe it is essential. Some
kind of veto power should be established
when it comes to making design decisions;
too many program managers do not feel re-
sponsible for operations costs and perhaps,
what is worse, are not held accountable for
it. Let there be no doubt that operational
costs are unacceptably high. An operational
concept must therefore be developed early
enough in the program to have an effecton
the design process.
Change Control. Once a program isunder-
way, the program manager's responsibility
is controlling change, which is inevitable.
Earlier I said that you cannot control what
you have not defined. It isequally true that
you cannot control changing something that
isnot defined. First know what itis!A com-
plete WBS with allocated schedule and cost
is, once again, the key. Change requests
must not be limited to solving a technical
problem. They must be accompanied by cost
and schedule impacts and, just as important,
lifecycle costimpacts.
In addition, there is always a rippling cost
impact caused by change. Other WBS ele-
ments may be affected, including items in
different contracts or in totally different
NASA codes, or line items. For these rea-
sons, change must be assessed at the systems
engineering level as well as at the WBS lev-
el. Perhaps the overriding rule is that
changes should be difficultto approve but
easy to implement once the decision ismade.
Managing Cost Reserves. A qualified cost
estimator would not let a program get start-
ed without making provision for cost over-
runs or reserve. The many uncertainties in a
development program make it essential. An
analysis of past programs allows a fairly ac-
curate estimate to be made of what is a rea-
sonable total amount as a percentage of total
costs, assuming that the programs are simi-
lar. Determining how and when the allow-
ance should be allocated is much more diffi-
cult. One school of thought says that re-
serves should be held at the highest level in
the program and applied only to correct un-
foreseen occurrences. The problem is that
this tends to bail out poor performers.
I believe that the reserve should be deter-
mined based on the perceived risk of the ele-
ment when the WBS is formulated. The
manager of the element should then be held
responsible for the stewardship of the re-
serve. In order for this to work, some sort of
reward system must be established for the
manager who does not spend the reserve. In
any case, it would be prudent to maintain
some reserve at the central level for those
things that cannot be anticipated. Just to
keep the system honest, a very simple track-
ing program can be established to follow the
expenditure of the reserves at the WBS ele-
ment level after the fact. I would like to see
an indepth study done on this subject.
Traps and Pitfalls
So far we have talked about where cost fits
into the program management and systems
engineering processes. There are a few areas
that may catch the program manager unpre-
pared and a few ideas that may be used to
make life a little easier in the future. It may
not be possible to implement all of them, but
it is worth a try.
Buying In. Ifyou are involved in the selling
of the program, the easiesttrap to fallinto is
underpricing the program. Despite storiesto
the contrary, I do not believe that this is a
matter of deliberate low bidding. Although I
once heard a distinguished gentleman say
that we do business the old fashioned way,
we do underbid and make up on change re-
quests. The fact is that every program man-
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ager I have ever met was convinced that he
or she could do it for less than the past record
would suggest. Unfortunately, this usually
involves changing the way we do business. I
believe that there are less expensive ways,
but you should tackle this one at your own
risk and only if you have the support of the
very top of the organization. The systems en-
gineer must be the conscience of the program
manager during this period.
Design to Budget. Let us assume that we
have completed a perfect Phase B and that
everything is in place, including the rate of
expenditure by year. It is a virtually certain
that two things will happen. First, with elo-
quent rationales and spreadsheets by the
ton, the various element managers will find
a need to increase their funding allocation.
One favorite argument will be that the sell-
ers of the program, who are no longer in
charge, will be blamed for not understanding
the problem. In addition, Congress may add
a requirement or two.
Second, the budget will be cut in the Agency,
at the Office of Management and Budget,
and finally in Congress. At this point, the in-
tricate patterns of dependency between per-
formance, cost and schedule begin to un-
ravel. In the first year, this is not devastat-
ing because you can always delay bringing
the prime contractors on board. But by the
time they arrive, the trap has been set for
the most insidious form of management, de-
sign to budget. Unfortunately, a fact of life is
that very few research and development pro-
grams have multi-year funding, and annual
budgets will be less than planned. The net
effect is that program costs will escalate, and
enormous pressures will attempt to bring
down the annual funding.
The first remedy is to stretch the schedule,
and the second is to reduce the scope of the
program. You will no doubt find yourselves
in this position, and you will receive a great
deal of advice from the nonparticipants, but
you should beware of "descoping." A cursory
examination of the cost models will show
that in the manned programs, only 20 cents
of every dollar go to hardware. (In the un-
manned programs, the number is closer to 40
cents.) Once the management structure is in
place and the contracts have been awarded,
virtually all of the other costs are fixed or
very difficult to reduce. Take out all the con-
tent and the program cost will still be 80 per-
cent of the estimate! The lesson is that if you
are forced to remove content, you should be
sure to take out every cent that is associated
with that content: prime wraps, nonprime
wraps, test beds, personnel, and, if neces-
sary, the kitchen sink. It will be difficult to
find, but it will be worth the effort.
If this were a mystery novel, it might well be
called "The Case of the Missing 80 Percent."
Where does it all go, and why is it only 60
percent for unmanned programs? Much of
this is valid and accounts for systems engi-
neering and integration at all levels of the
program, including test and evaluation, op-
erations, and many other things. But it also
accounts for duplication of test facilities,
overlaps between assignments, management
style, inefficiencies and a host of hidden
costs associated with maintaining the insti-
tutions that are often invisible to the pro-
gram manager. The systems engineer is re-
sponsible for ferreting out the good from the
bad. It is a simple fact that the first one per-
cent reduction in these wraps (80 percent to
79 percent) increases the amount of hard-
ware by five percent (20 percent to 21 per-
cent)! A 20 percent improvement in the
wraps (80 percent to 60 percent) results in a
doubling of the hardware (20 percent to 40
percent) or cutting the program costs in half
for the same amount of hardware! "Thar's
gold in them thar hills."
The UPN System. The NASA budget is pre-
pared and submitted using a system of
breakdowns known as the unique project
number (UPN) system. All parts of the
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Agency are required to report their annual
needs on the basis of this system, including
the program offices.From a program point of
view, a fatal flaw in this process isthe num-
bering system, which generally describes
functions rather than end items and isthere-
fore not in consonance with the principles of
a WBS system.
It isessential that the program manager be
able to trace the equivalence of the UPN
number and itscorresponding WBS element.
This will require a joint effortbetween sys-
tems engineering and the program control
people. Without this traceabilitymatrix, the
program manager will not know what isbe-
ing asked for or where the money is going.
Too often the UPN number is perceived as
directly equivalent to the WBS element, but
this is very seldom the case unless the WBS
isnot end-item oriented. (The latterhappens
more often than itshould.) One way to avoid
this situation is to make the annual budget
callfor the program using the WBS system
and then translate itto the UPN system for
the purpose of aggregating the total NASA
budget. I have never seen this happen.
The Cost of Operations. I mentioned earli-
er that the costs of operations are now about
50 percent of the NASA budget. This is part-
ly due to the increase in the operational life
of a program and to the fact that we have not
learned to design systems for operability. It
has not been necessary in the past. It is also
true that the productivity of the operations
infrastructure has not been high on the pro-
gram manager's list. If we are to reduce total
program costs, which are vital to the Agency
and to the program, it is time to strike a new
level of cooperation between these two nor-
mally separate parts. The program and the
systems engineer must assume a large part
of the responsibility.
The Institution and the Program
Although not directly related to the systems
engineering process, a number of things bear
directly on the program and have a major ef-
fecton the abilityto perform the various pro-
gram functions.These generally concern the
relationship between the program and the
institution. NASA was originally estab-
lished using the resources of the National
Advisory Committee forAeronautics, known
as NACA, an aeronautical research organi-
zation that was seldom involved in large de-
velopment programs. The budget was rela-
tivelysmall, and there were few contractors.
In fact, all contracts were signed at the
Washington office,the NACA equivalent of
Headquarters.
Itquickly became apparent that, in addition
to the research centers, a development cen-
ter was needed. Goddard Space Flight Cen-
ter (GSFC) was established to perform this
function. This was rapidly followed by the
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) in
Houston, the George C. Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, and the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasade-
na. Almost immediately, GSFC and JPL be-
came responsible for multiple unmanned
programs, which were largely contained
within a single Center, and JSC and MSFC
became responsible for multi-center manned
programs. In both cases, program offices
were established and the Centers provided
the resources, both personnel and facilities,
to support the program.
With the exception ofJPL, which isa Feder-
allyfunded research and development center
and operates outside the civilservice system,
all NASA personnel and basic facilitiesare
funded separately from the programs in line
items known as Research and Program Man-
agement (RPM) and Construction of Facili-
ties (CoF). Program-specific facilitiesare
funded by the program and these facilities
are most oRen operated by support contrac-
tors, also funded by the program. This sys-
tem was established so that the programs
would be managed by government personnel
who would rotate from program to program
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and carry their experience with them. This
worked very well until the late 1960s when
the budget began to fall rapidly, and there
was a significant reduction in NASA person-
nel.
By the early seventies, both the budget and
the number of personnel had been cut in
half, but the number of Centers remained es-
sentially the same. The cost of maintaining
the institution could no longer be sustained
by the RPM and CoF line items. The solution
was to tax the programs based on the num-
ber of personnel that were applied to the pro-
gram. Unfortunately, the program manager
does not decide how many people should
work on the program, which, by tradition, is
the responsibility of the Center director.
Neither does the program manager partici-
pate in determining the level of the tax.
These decisions, again by tradition, are
made by the comptroller.
Maintaining the Institution
Unless the basic system of funding personnel
is changed, the programs will most certainly
be responsible for funding some of the insti-
tutional costs that are not related to the pro-
gram; the RPM budget will never be allowed
to grow to compensate for this. The question
is rather how large the institution needs to
be to support the program and how that deci-
sion is made. I mentioned earlier that the
WBS should represent the totality of the pro-
gram and should always describe deliver-
ables; this problem runs counter to that prin-
ciple. I believe that the solution lies in ac-
cepting this cost for what it is, negotiating
the level of tax with the program manager
for the duration of the program, and taking
it off the top each year. It may not be control-
lable in the normal sense, but at least it is a
known number.
Personally, I believe that the Agency would
be better served ifthe development centers
were managed using an industrial funding
system similar to JPL and many other gov-
ernment facilities, including the Navy labs.
But until that happens, it will be necessary
to find some balance between the institu-
tional and program needs.
Management Stability
Every program will change management
during its life cycle. The common practice in
NASA has been to make these changes de-
liberately between phases. It is not uncom-
mon to see as many as four different manag-
ers during a program, including a specialist
in closing off completed programs. The posi-
tive side to this is that it is possible to match
the needs of each phase of a program to the
special capabilities within the Agency. The
negative side is that each manager has a dif-
ferent style, each program has different
management needs, and often these do not
match when the changeover occurs between
phases. One way is not always right and an-
other always wrong, but each is different,
and changes even in management style can,
and usually do, increase the cost of the pro-
gram. The secret then is to stick with a team
as long as possible, particularly the systems
engineering team, something that is easy to
say and difficult to do in these times of de-
clining internal expertise and increasing re-
tirements.
The Tyranny of Experience
Too often, you will find resistance to change
in the way things are done. "We have always
been successful (measured by performance)
doing it this way, and its very dangerous to
change winning ways." "If it ain't broke,
don't fix it." "You get no credit for an on-time
failure." All true and at the same time, de-
structive to valid new ways of doing busi-
ness, especially when it comes to introducing
more efficient or less expensive ways. When
the space program started, we had no exper-
ience and what followed was the most inno-
vative and exciting period in the history of
high technology programs. But now we have
all that experience, and it has become a bur-
den. By all means, you should keep the wise
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heads around (they may still save you), but
take advantage of the explosion in new tech-
nologies and capabilities, which allows for
things that we could only dream of 30 years
ago. You should be careful before you intro-
duce a change, but you should not dismiss it
out of hand.
Does It Matter?
We have been in the civilian space business
for almost 40 years, and time after time we
have shown that we can rise to any chal-
lenge and lead the competition, provided we
have the resources. Time and time again the
Federal Government has provided the re-
sources. We have been the envy of the world.
We have written the book on the subject,
both from a technical and a management
sense.
Until now, it was enough to know that we
were the best. There was no established com-
petition, most of the money was spent inter-
nally, and cost efficiency was second to per-
formance. Some have characterized it as a
Works Projects Administration (WPA) for
the technologists! The problem is that in this
era of budget deficits and trade deficits,
there is not enough discretionary money to
go around. Even without international com-
petition, it would be imperative to get more
out of our research dollars. The trouble is
that we have learned profligate ways, as nei-
ther the government nor the contractors give
rewards for cost efficiency. While we were
basking in this glory, the rest of the world
has been catching up; they have read the
book. The competition, supported by their
governments, isgetting good and fierce.
But there isa difference;the competition be-
lievesthat the space business ishere to stay.
Isaid space business, but I meant commerce,
and in commerce cost efficiency is para-
mount. Do we stillwant to stay at the top, or
are we ready to leave it to the rest of the
world? Are we prepared to do what is neces-
sary to stay in the game? After all,it'sonly a
space program. Does itmatter? You bet!
Can Anything Be Done?
In this paper, I have attempted to show
where cost fits into the space program's engi-
neering and management business. A combi-
nation of things have placed cost at the bot-
tom of the priority ladder except in matters
of the inexorable annual budget. There are
many ways to improve cost efficiency, some
of which are available to the program man-
ager. In the long run, it will take a concerted
effort by all of us to make a difference. The
Executive branch and Congress, together
with industry and academia, must work as
before, when we perceived that we were sec-
ond. In the meantime, I hope that I have
been able to give the budding systems engi-
neer and program manager a few tips to do
something about the problem of cost consid-
erations. We can only do something about it
ifwe want to!
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